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Out of Sync: Section 8 and 
Technological Advancement in 
Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
Susan Magotiaux* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Canadian legislation on police powers in the criminal sphere have 
recently been “updated” and the Supreme Court of Canada has 
considered and pronounced on conflicts of privacy and investigation in a 
digital context. But are we doing enough to adapt to the changing context 
or are we out of sync?  
This article offers a review of recent Supreme Court of Canada 
search and seizure cases to demonstrate the awkward ongoing waltz of 
old law and new technology. In 2013-2014, the Supreme Court decided 
R. v. Vu,1 R. v. TELUS Communications Co.,2 R. v. Spencer3 and R. v. 
Fearon;4 four cases addressing the parameters of section 8 of the Charter5 
in the context of computers, digital communications, Internet subscriber 
information and mobile phones, respectively. In each case the Court was 
forced to confront the ill-matched partnership between technology and 
legal principle. Is a computer a thing? Are texts like conversations? 
When is a phone like a computer? When is a computer like a filing 
cabinet? Can we claim anonymity online? The carefully crafted answers 
are meaningful, but the time lag between actual technological 
developments and consideration of the limits of police powers in using 
those advancements hampers law enforcement and leaves rights-holders 
suspicious and uncertain. It’s an ill-fated marriage; law and technology. 
                                                                                                                       
*  Counsel, Crown Law Office Criminal, Ministry of the Attorney General for Ontario. The 
views expressed in this article are those of the author alone. 
1  [2013] S.C.J. No. 60, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657, 2013 SCC 60 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Vu”]. 
2  [2013] S.C.J. No. 16, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 3, 2013 SCC 16 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “TELUS”]. 
3  [2014] S.C.J. No. 43, [2014] S.C.R. 212, 2014 SCC 43 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Spencer”]. 
4  [2014] S.C.J. No. 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, 2014 SCC 77 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fearon”]. 
5  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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One is the result of researched, reasoned, incremental progress, the other 
a dash of innovation and experiment. No wonder we can’t keep up. 
Police seeking guidance are met with confusion. Section 8 of the 
Charter protects citizens from unreasonable search and seizure. Since 
Hunter v. Southam6 in 1984, the starting place for a constitutional search 
is pre-authorization. Technology challenges our ability to plan ahead. For 
computer searches, officers increasingly don’t know where evidence will 
be, in what form, or how it may be accessed. Data cannot always be 
seized, brought back and examined later. Leaving aside the technical 
question of how things can be seized, the “what” and “why” of privacy 
determinations are also moving targets. Figuring out what will be 
reasonable, on a normative appreciation of privacy, is a daunting task not 
well suited to frontline investigatory work.  
The potential for the commission and facilitation of crime online, and 
the amplified impact and permanence of harm done to some victims of 
crime cannot be forgotten in the dialogue. Safety, security and the 
suppression of crime are legitimate countervailing concerns. As succinctly 
put by Binnie J. in R. v. Tessling, the community wants privacy but it also 
insists on protection.7 The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly rooted 
privacy decisions in the values and reasonable expectations of Canadians, 
not in the technical fine-points of a given intrusion.8 The focus is and 
should remain on what we are willing to give up in the ground between 
privacy and law enforcement objectives, not on what tools will we use to 
carve the dividing line in any given case. Section 8 jurisprudence has 
developed with a lens wide enough to encompass the changing tides of 
technology.9  
II. SECTION 8 AND “NEW” TECHNOLOGY IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Police powers get tested against the section 8 standard in the 
courtroom. As social behaviour changes and lives are lived increasingly 
online or leaving traceable digital breadcrumbs, it is of course logical 
that investigation of crime will engage more and more technological 
tools and digital landscapes. Police will capture digital evidence, 
                                                                                                                       
6  Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.). 
7  R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, 2004 SCC 67, at para. 17 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tessling”]. 
8  Id., at paras. 29-30; R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, at 43-44 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Wong”]. 
9  Wong, id., at 44. 
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prosecutors will bring cases of cybercrime and judges will be called upon 
to draw reasonable boundaries in an uncertain field.  
The struggle to understand new technology and apply legal 
principles is not new. The fundamental and normative principles of 
privacy that guide Canadian courts can and do adapt to brave new 
worlds. Vu, Fearon and Spencer offer some salient examples of practical 
application of traditional search principles in the technological age. They 
offer warnings too. Both must be heeded if we are to successfully 
navigate these uncharted waters. 
1.  Is it a Bird? Is it a Plane? 
There is nothing new about approaching new information by trying 
to fit it into existing paradigms. Start with what you know. But in many 
cases, technology shifts too far for analogy to past experience to be 
instructive. For computers and other digital devices, attempts to 
analogize to more traditional tangibles have recently been curtailed.  
In Vu, Cromwell J., writing for the Supreme Court of Canada, 
conclusively settled the debate; computers are not like filing cabinets. 
They are not like briefcases, and cannot be approached in the same 
fashion in applying section 8 analysis and determining where the 
individual’s right to be left alone is drawn. A warrant can authorize a 
search through whatever cupboards and closets may contain the items to 
be seized, but it cannot authorize dumping the digital drawers of a 
computer without explicit reference. Justice Cromwell noted that 
computers differ in important ways from the receptacles we have 
considered under the traditional section 8 framework and computer 
searches give rise to unique privacy concerns that are not adequately 
addressed by the “old” approach.10 Post-Vu, police must obtain specific 
pre-authorization to search a computer.11 
The discarding of analogies to non-digital receptacles was an 
important and necessary step in bringing search law up to date. Not just 
because of the sheer amount of information potentially accessible to 
authorities on a personal computer, but, as explored in Vu, because the 
nature of digital information and evidence is of different quality in ways 
                                                                                                                       
10  Vu, supra, note 1, at para. 2. 
11  Vu does leave room for the unanticipated find; a device found when executing a warrant 
can be seized for preservation and a fresh authorization sought to particularly address the 
authorization for computer search, Vu, supra, note 1, at para. 49. 
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that matter in the privacy debate. Unlike in cupboards and desks, digital 
data is created without conscious action or even knowledge of the user 
and may remain, in recoverable form, when the user tries to destroy it. 
The individual control over personal information is reduced in digital 
data, and control over information is a key component to informational 
privacy.12  
In Fearon, Cromwell J., again writing for the Court, maintained the 
consistent message that digital devices require a fresh approach. Cell 
phones and other mobile communications devices, like the computers 
considered in Vu, cannot be understood for section 8 purposes as the 
equivalent of briefcases and purses.13 Again, the Court emphasized the 
nature and scope of the information potentially (though not inevitably) 
accessible to law enforcement through the digital device and found that 
the new technologies required a new and specific restraint of police 
power.  
The Fearon majority made the important point that courts should 
avoid crafting different tests for the different capabilities of individual 
technological devices.14 Examination or search of computers and 
smartphones does not inherently or inevitably result in a vast invasion of 
personal privacy. The device itself may not contain intimate details, and, 
significantly, police can be constrained in examination. As demonstrated 
in Fearon, it is possible to add safeguards to the exercise of police power 
to ensure section 8 compliance. The majority imposed measures to limit 
the potential privacy intrusion by modifying the common law search 
incident to arrest power and rejected the “all or nothing” approach.  
2.  R. v. Spencer  A New Normative 
Section 8 cases struggle with the balance between individual 
intrusions and law enforcement objectives. Finding the line is an exercise 
in value interpretation. The broader context complicates our sense of 
normal. The world has changed rapidly. That is hardly a new sentiment.15 
But in the specific realm of public accessibility of personal information, 
the daily lives of young Canadians display a seismic shift from former 
                                                                                                                       
12  Vu, supra, note 1, at para. 24. See also paras. 40-44. 
13  Fearon, supra, note 4, at para. 51. 
14  Fearon, supra, note 4, at para. 52. 
15  See discussion of public fear at the introduction of the threatening new technology of 
Kodak in 1902 in Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, “A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and 
Shifting Social Norms” (2013) 16 Yale J.L. & Tech 59, at 72. 
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generations. Classrooms have twitter feeds, pre-teens have YouTube 
channels, and images of our families, our pets, our food, our fashion, our 
failures and our friends are posted or transmitted in ever-growing circles, 
out of our control. Emotions are expressed with emoticons. Relationships 
bloom, grow and wither with no in-person contact; love at first site, first 
byte. Businesses gather and collate our mass digital dalliances to predict 
our preferences and provide us with better more individualized products 
and services.16 That’s “normal”. 
There is and absolutely should be a high standard for state access to 
the personal pieces we wish to guard, but courts, or rather judges, who 
may not be personally entrenched in the digital norm of today’s youth, 
cannot be expected to measure with precision the social temperature on 
privacy. We want privacy but we want publicity too. We overshare but 
might later wish for over-protection, though it is well-accepted that the 
Charter does not protect want we want to be kept confidential, only what 
we can reasonably expect to keep private.17 
In Tessling, Binnie J., for the Court, remarked that “a person can 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in what he or she knowingly 
exposes to the public, or to a section of the public, or abandons in a 
public place”.18 In the “public” spaces of online activity, the line is no 
longer as clear.  
In Spencer, the Court addressed file-sharing over public paths and 
the scope of police power to put a subscriber’s name and address to a 
publicly broadcast Internet Protocol (“IP”) address. 
Spencer’s actual finding was of limited scope; police must now 
obtain prior judicial authorization to access basic subscriber information 
from an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”). The discussion around how 
courts approach and should approach privacy dialogue in a digital age 
was far-reaching. Privacy is a normative concept. It must be considered 
anew in each context. Courts assessing privacy interests must consider 
not only what we actually believe is confidential or protected, but also 
what we want to be private.19 The social values of Canadian society 
weigh heavily in the mix. Social values, of course, change and conflict.  
                                                                                                                       
16  Tene & Polonetsky provide a review of various corporate attempts at data analysis and 
tailored marketing and service-delivery and the mixed consumer response to use of data. 
17  Tessling, supra, note 7, at para. 26. 
18  Id., at para. 40. 
19  Spencer, supra, note 3, at para. 18; Tessling, supra, note 7, at para. 42; R. v. Patrick, 
[2009] S.C.J. No. 17, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579, 2009 SCC 17, at para. 14 (S.C.C.). 
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In Spencer, the Supreme Court of Canada explored an emerging 
concept in the privacy debate; a right to anonymity.20 Spencer broke new 
ground in search law by defining informational privacy as comprised of 
three elements: secrecy, control and anonymity.21 The concept of 
anonymity was “not novel” but the application to the Internet context and 
the suggestion of a right to anonymity in the online world is an extension 
of uncertain ambit. The Court acknowledged the concern that over-
extension of online anonymity protection could impede the investigation 
of Internet crime, but responded that “recognizing that there may be a 
privacy interest in anonymity depending on the circumstances falls short 
of recognizing any ‘right’ to anonymity and does not threaten the 
effectiveness of law enforcement in relation to offences committed on the 
Internet”.22 While a totality of circumstances test can never offer precise 
predictability, it is questionable how police will translate such nuanced 
analysis into frontline decisions about the scope of their powers. 
3.  The Third Party Problem 
In traditional search analysis, when evidence was found in shoe 
boxes and file cabinets, courts could analyze assertions of privacy by 
reference to such (non-exhaustive) factors as ownership and the ability to 
exercise control over a space or to exclude people.23 Now we cannot 
exclude the third parties from our information, though many could, 
practically speaking, exclude us. A web-based e-mail service may choose 
to preserve what the user would prefer to erase.24 A company, within the 
bounds of privacy legislation and court orders, sets policy on when and 
how it will provide data to police, and the contracts imposed on users 
ultimately come to factor into the decision on what we expected and 
could reasonably expect to remain private. Spencer demonstrated the 
                                                                                                                       
20  The concept of a right to Internet anonymity was earlier developed in a very similar 
context by Doherty J.A. writing for the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Ward, [2012] O.J. No. 4587, 
2012 ONCA 660, 112 O.R. (3d) 321, at paras. 70-75 (Ont. C.A.). Justice Doherty’s analysis was 
cited with approval in Spencer, supra, note 3, at para. 48. 
21  Spencer, supra, note 3, at para. 4. 
22  Id., at para. 49. 
23  R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, at para. 45 (S.C.C.). Of course, 
the Supreme Court has adapted the framework for questions of informational privacy and applied 
analysis to developing technologies and computer contexts: R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, [1993] 
3 S.C.R. 281, at 45 (S.C.C.); Tessling, supra, note 7, at para. 32; R. v. Cole, [2012] S.C.J. No. 53, 
[2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, 2012 SCC 53, at paras. 39-58 (S.C.C.). 
24  See discussion of TELUS, below. 
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difficult decision as to how to weigh contractual terms in the privacy 
balance.25 While the Court in Spencer found that there is “no doubt” that 
contractual and statutory schemes play an important role in the 
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, their weight in the balance is 
uncertain.26  
Our lack of control over digital information in the hands of third 
parties is a social problem beyond the criminal arena. Permanence of past 
slips is a pressing global concern. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union issued a ground-breaking judgment in May 2014, finding that a 
person had a “right to be forgotten” and that an Internet search engine 
had a legal obligation to act on personal requests to remove links to 
historical information that was accurate when posted but is irrelevant, 
inadequate or excessive in light of passage of time.27 The decision has 
sparked international conversation and debate about the ability to 
regulate the Internet and exercise control over information in the public 
domain.28 Freedom of expression clashes with freedom from the 
permanent links of history, but it is Google that must balance the 
interests of the individual requester and the public interest in access to 
information. No one is quite sure where privacy interests lay, or how they 
change with age. 
4.  Passwords and Protocols 
The Supreme Court has effectively (and wisely) avoided pushing 
judges too far into the forensic technology world at the stage of judicial 
pre-authorization for anticipated search and seizure. In Vu, the Court 
                                                                                                                       
25  Spencer, supra, note 3, at paras. 52-60. See also R. v. Gomboc, [2010] S.C.J. No. 55, 
[2010] 3 S.C.R. 211, 2010 SCC 55 (S.C.C.). 
26  Spencer, supra, note 3, at para. 54. 
27  Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) 
and Mario Costeja González, OJ C 165, 9.6.2012, Case C-131/12, Court of Justice, May 13, 2014. 
See also Google’s Report on implementation of the judgment “The Advisory Council to Google on 
the Right to be Forgotten”, February 6, 2015, accessed April 3, 2015 online: <https://www.google.com/ 
advisorycouncil/>. 
28  See for example: Katie Engelhart, “The right to be forgotten online: Will it ruin the 
Internet?”, MacLean’s, November 10, 2014, accessed April 2, 2015 online: <http://www.macleans.ca/ 
news/world/the-right-to-be-forgotten-online-will-it-ruin-the-internet/>; François LeBel & Mandy 
Woodland, “The Right to be Forgotten”, Privacy Pages, October 2014 – CBA National Privacy and 
Access Law Section Newsletter, accessed April 1, 2015 online: <http://www.cba.org/CBA/ 
sections_privacy/newsletters2014/forgotten.aspx.>; and Andre Mayer, “‘Right to be forgotten’: How 
Canada could adopt similar law for online privacy”, June 16, 2014, accessed April 3, 2015 online: 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/right-to-be-forgotten-how-canada-could-adopt-similar-law-for-
online-privacy-1.2676880>. 
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considered and rejected a proposal that all computer searches be pre-
authorized with a specific examination protocol.29 Although judicial 
officers retain the discretion to impose conditions in any warrant to 
search, extending the obligation to require advance approval of the 
detailed manner of search would be impractical, if not impossible, and is 
not required to ensure constitutionality of a computer search. The Court 
recognized that technological advancement leads to uncertainty in 
predicting the investigative tools that may be required to meet law 
enforcement objectives in a given case. Evidence cannot be found in 
discrete “places” on a device, and all manner of methods may be used to 
“hide” evidence. Without knowing in advance how devices or technology 
has been used, police cannot rationally set plans for forensic 
examination, and judicial officers cannot be expected to meaningfully 
evaluate any such technical strategy. 
Search protocols may be possible in the right case, and may be 
imposed under the discretionary powers of an issuing justice. Although 
finding that protocols were not constitutionally required, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged that Parliament could take action in delineating 
standard conditions, and that police could, where appropriate in the 
circumstances, return to a justice post execution to seek a second 
authorization with clarified terms or limits reflective of the preliminary 
discovery and informed assessment of necessary tools and examination.30 
The Court allowed for room to grow into our technological 
understanding. For now, in most cases of computer seizure, it is highly 
unlikely that police could set out with any kind of useful precision the 
exact pathways and plans for a digital examination. Any current forensic 
strategies may well be obsolete between drafting and application given 
the speed and permutations of technological advancement. 
Protocols were approached with caution in Vu and passwords were 
similarly sidelined as the arbiters of privacy in Fearon, where the 
Supreme Court dialled back the technical distinction that had gained 
traction in lower courts.31 The Fearon Court dismissed an argument that 
the presence or absence of a password should be definitive in the privacy 
analysis. Again, it was a practical approach. It is dangerous to ascribe 
legal meaning to an ill-understood feature of some devices, some of the 
time. In the cases before Fearon, the password problem had been a 
                                                                                                                       
29  Vu, supra, note 1, at paras. 53-62. 
30  Vu, supra, note 1, at paras. 56 and 62. 
31  Fearon, supra, note 4, at para. 53. 
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dividing line. The Court of Appeal in Fearon prompted headlines with a 
finding that the cursory mobile phone search conducted incident to arrest 
would not have been permitted had the phone been password-protected.32 
In Nova Scotia, the Court of Appeal took a different view, finding that 
that “because a password is not on at the very moment the police seize a 
cell phone cannot mean that the state is welcome and free to roam 
through its contents”.33 Fearon avoided ascribing prominence to the 
presence or activation of a particular feature  it was but one fairly 
insignificant factor in the totality of circumstances establishing an 
expectation of privacy. Though, as a matter of practice, technological 
features such as passwords or encryption can frustrate the exercise of 
police powers regardless of where the legal debate lands. 
III. TECHNOLOGY AND THE CRIMINAL CODE SEARCH POWERS 
Search law in Canada has a rich history of back and forth between 
courts and Parliament. Cases are pursued through provincial courts, the 
Supreme Court decides an issue, and Parliament responds with 
amendments to the search provisions to address a constitutional 
shortcoming or gap.34 It has happened with consent wiretaps,35 video 
surveillance warrants,36 tracking warrants37 and emergency wiretaps.38 
                                                                                                                       
32  R. v. Fearon, [2013] O.J. No. 704, 2013 ONCA 106, 114 O.R. (3d) 81, at paras. 73-75 
(Ont. C.A.); “OK for police to search cellphone if no password, says court”, February 21, 2013, 
CBC News, online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ok-for-police-to-search-cellphone-if-
no-password-says-court-1.1310260>. 
33  R. v. Hiscoe, [2013] N.S.J. No. 188, 2013 NSCA 48, 328 N.S.R. (2d) 381, at para. 81 
(N.S.C.A.). 
34  For a historical look at Parliament’s Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter 
“Criminal Code”] responses to Supreme Court of Canada cases on s. 8, see Michal Fairburn, 
“Twenty-Five Years in Search of a Reasonable Approach” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 55 [hereinafter 
“Fairburn”]. 
35  The 1990 decision in R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Duarte”] was followed by s. 184.2 [as am. S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 4] of the Criminal Code, 
supra, note 34, governing interception of communications where one party has consented. 
36  Wong, supra, note 8, decided the same year as Duarte, id., led to the enactment of video 
surveillance provisions located in a general search warrant section (487.01) but importing the 
protections of Part VI wiretap authorizations, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, the Crown 
Liability and Proceedings Act and the Radiocommunications Act, S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 15. 
37  After the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Wise, [1992] S.C.J. No. 16, [1992] 
1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.), regarding the privacy intrusion on a beeper used to track a vehicle, Parliament 
added s. 492.1 [as am. S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 18] of the Criminal Code, supra, note 34, to specifically 
authorize the use of tracking devices. 
38  After R. v. Tse, [2012] S.C.J. No. 16, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 531, 2012 SCC 16 (S.C.C.), 
Parliament enacted amendments to Part VI to require both notice and reporting on emergency 
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But the glacial pace of a case’s progression on the plodding wheels of 
justice to the pinnacle, followed by a run through the law-making mill, is 
an obviously poor pathway for response to rapid advancement of 
technology. The resulting Criminal Code is a patchwork of isolated 
responses to specific search problems, rather than a contemplated and 
cohesive whole.39 At its very foundation, the Code embodies concepts 
that are losing their relevance in a digital age. 
1.  Traditional Warrants and Authorization 
The bedrock of police search powers in the Criminal Code is the 
search warrant. Found in section 487, it is the original and generalized 
vehicle for judicial pre-authorization of state intrusion into the sphere of 
personal privacy. When the necessary grounds are made out, a justice 
may authorize the seizure of things that may afford evidence of an 
offence from a specific named place. Things in places. That bedrock may 
have faults.  
Is a computer a thing? Is the data on it a thing? Is the string of binary 
code sent through satellites in pieces and reassembled at some other 
machine a thing? Is it the same “thing” when it lands as it is when it 
travels in pieces? And what of the places? Police can’t knock and 
announce their presence at the door of satellites and clouds and mobile 
servers. Yet without particularity of place, current tools may be 
unavailable. 
The search provisions in the Criminal Code have been updated to 
address the lack of tangibility and physical presence of digital data. In 
1997, section 487 was amended to include provisions aimed directly at 
the problem of gathering digital “things”. Section 487(2.1) and (2.2) 
provide that, in a regular search warrant under section 487, a police 
officer or a person at the search location may “use or cause to be used 
any computer system at the building or place to search any data 
contained in or available to the computer system”. The scope of the 
subsection has not been widely considered. It is potentially boundless. If 
taking and examining the desktop box was deemed in R. v. Morelli to be 
the most intrusive, extensive, and invasive search imaginable,40 what 
                                                                                                                       
wiretaps to address constitutional infirmities identified in the Supreme Court decision: Response to 
the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v. Tse Act, S.C. 2013, c. 8. 
39  Fairburn, supra, note 34, at 79 and 82-83. 
40  R. v. Morelli, [2010] S.C.J. No. 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, 2010 SCC 8, at paras. 2-3 and 
105 (S.C.C.). 
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about a search of all that is “accessible to” that box while its stands 
connected in a home or office? Depending on the configurations and 
active connections of a given device, there could be data accessible to the 
device from other people, other networks, other countries, or other 
businesses. The section 487 warrant looks for things in a place, yet the 
Court in Vu recognized that “a search of a computer connected to the 
Internet or a network gives access to information and documents that are 
not in any meaningful sense at the location for which the search is 
authorized”.41  
Wiretap provisions have also fallen out of step. Part VI of the 
Criminal Code governs interception of private communications. Modern 
communications are not fixed in time and place in the same fashion as 
communications over original telephone wires used to be, making our 
traditional understanding of “wiretapping” an uneasy fit with the reality 
of police investigations involving private communication. The wire room 
is now wireless. Telephone conversation used to disappear when they 
were over, so police required the extraordinary power to grab them from 
the airspace and record them for eternity. Modern communications do not 
fit that mold.42 Communications are far more often recorded in transit, 
independent of police involvement and may be stored routinely by 
external companies, and sometimes sent in indecipherable code, 
encryption, to maintain privacy in transit. Applications and devices are 
peddled on the Internet marketplace that boast features designed to 
maintain secrecy and destroy all digital trace of our doings. 
In 1990, when R. v. Duarte was decided on the issue of recording 
communications, La Forest J., writing for the majority, was  
concerned with the state taking the transient spoken word and 
immortalizing it in exact replica. He wrote that privacy would be 
destroyed if the state were free, unfettered, to make surreptitious 
permanent electronic recordings of our private communications.43 Pre-
authorization was required to guard against the “insidious danger” that 
the state would “record and transmit our words”.44 We have come a 
                                                                                                                       
41  Vu, supra, note 1, at para. 44. Justice Cromwell, for the Court, later expressly noted that 
police executing a traditional warrant to search that did specifically address computer search would 
have the benefit of s. 487(2.1) and (2.2) to gather data, though there was no particular discussion of 
the ambit or implications of that avenue of search. 
42  For discussion of the application of electronic surveillance requirements to telephone and 
then digital communications in the United States, see Susan Freiwald, “First Principles of 
Communication Privacy”, 2007 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 3, at paras. 13-18. 
43  Duarte, supra, note 35, at para. 22. 
44  Id., at para. 21. 
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significant distance since Duarte. In text-based communications, 
standard fare for younger generations, the originator of a communication 
is the one creating the permanent record and releasing it to the 
uncontrolled cyberspace. The state no longer holds the secret 
microphone, but merely accesses that which the sender has packaged in 
permanency.45 The Supreme Court has been clear to cut chords with the 
past where limits do not make sense in modern technological reality. 
Computers are not filing cabinets and phones are not briefcases. 
Communications too have changed in character as well as in form. 
Privacy will need to be reconsidered in this new context. 
The 2013 decision in TELUS is a good example of the difficulty 
understanding technology and applying traditional concepts to an 
untraditional world. In TELUS, police sought stored text-messages as 
well as future, as yet unsent, messages to be delivered on a prospective, 
ongoing basis. Although the subject matter of the search was clear, the 
future communications of named targets, the Supreme Court was 
significantly divided on the proper approach for law enforcement.46 
Justice Abella, for three justices, found that Part VI authorization  
(a “wiretap”) was required because an intercept occurs whenever the 
police acquire the content of a text message from a service provider who 
has stored it during the transmission process.47 Justice Moldaver, for two 
justices, agreed that Part VI was the right tool but for a different reason. 
He declined to define “intercept” but found that courts should approach 
the question from a standpoint of substantial equivalence, that is, if what 
the police are seeking in substance looks like an intercept, then that is the 
appropriate form and standard of pre-authorization.48 The Chief Justice 
and Cromwell J. dissented, and commented that the definition of 
intercept proposed by Abella J. would undermine well-established law 
that said stored communications, already delivered, were accessible by 
                                                                                                                       
45  For recent discussion in lower courts on the application of Duarte to text-based 
undercover communications, see R. v. Ghorta, “Ruling #1: The Admissibility of Text Messages” 
(unreported decision of Durno J., Brampton, Ont. S.C.J., March 16, 2015) and R. v. Graff, [2015] 
A.J. No. 717, 2014 ABQB 415, at paras. 51-66 (Alta. Q.B.). 
46  The availability of already sent and stored text-messages was not contentious; the parties 
agreed that stored text messages were available by production order: TELUS, supra, note 2, at para. 11. 
47  TELUS, supra, note 2, at paras. 1-46. 
48  Id., at paras. 47-108. Justice Moldaver was influenced by the statutory exclusion of the 
use of general warrants where another authorization was available in the Code (s. 487.01(2)(c)) and 
by the fact that the statutory preconditions for an intercept were significantly more onerous than the 
general warrant. 
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search warrant.49 Text communications may have been intercepted by 
Telus, but police did not “intercept” when they obtained the already 
stored messages. The dissenters would have found that the general 
warrant, not an authorization for interception, could properly support the 
police request. 
TELUS tells us how much we don’t understand about technology. 
Law enforcement in the midst of an investigation must determine what 
pre-authorization tool is available and should be sought to permit 
particular evidence-gathering techniques. Yet even at the highest court in 
the country, with years of research and contemplation to assist, the 
answer remains uncertain.  
TELUS is also an instructive lesson in the power of third party 
information holders. The intercept crystallized for three justices, at the 
point that the police acquired the messages. But police could only access 
that content because Telus, as a business practice, had formed a system 
where all messages were copied and temporarily stored. The average 
consumer will not likely know the storage practices of her service 
provider. If a telecommunications provider’s decisions as to how to store 
communications, unbeknownst to clients, could define law enforcement 
powers of access, the result would be inconsistent and unprincipled. Yet 
modern information storage and communication is heavily dependent on 
the facilities and services of private entities. How much power do our 
court decisions put in the hands of profit-driven private entities? 
2. New Provisions: Bill C-13 
In March 2015, new provisions came into effect to update the 
Criminal Code search scheme. The new powers include separate 
authorizations for transmission data, data preservation schemes, tracking 
warrants for things and for people, and several new species of production 
order depending on the type of data sought. “Data”, “transmission data” 
and “tracking data” are also newly defined.50 It is too soon to say 
whether law enforcement will find the new tools meaningful, and 
whether courts will find them a sensible matrix for the consideration of 
criminal search powers. There are likely to be some growing pains.  
                                                                                                                       
49  TELUS, supra, note 2, at paras. 109-196; reference to the inconsistency between the 
reasons of Abella J. and prior law on computer search of stored communications at para. 155. 
50  Criminal Code, supra, note 34, s. 487.011 [as am. S.C. 2014, c. 31, s. 20]. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
There is yet no legislative response to recent computer and cellphone 
cases in the Supreme Court. While the judgments in Vu and Fearon leave 
room for legislated options to address seizure of computers and search of 
mobile devices, they do not specifically call out for reform or identify a 
pressing need for amendment. In Fearon, the majority indicated that 
legislation “may well be desirable” and that there are many ways in 
which the law enforcement and privacy concerns may be balanced in the 
digital context.51 Parliament has not demonstrated an appetite to enact 
particular conditions for computer search. Spencer may yet invoke a 
Parliamentary response, though it would be in the realm of a new 
power52 not conditions of search.  
The Charter leaves room to address the problem of after-the-fact 
resolution of legal lines of privacy. Although the Supreme Court has 
stated that police should err on the side of caution, usually pre-
authorization, when faced with grey areas of law, the analysis under 
section 24(2) of the Charter permits admissibility of evidence in the 
broader interests of justice even where breaches have occurred. Where 
the law changes post-search, as opposed to just being unclear, exclusion 
of evidence is less likely to result.53  
Statutory provisions and legal distinctions should not be technology-
based. They will be too fleeting. Tessling’s wisdom should be heeded; 
focus on the information obtained by the technique in the case at hand 
and deal with advances step by step, as they actually arise.54 Vu and 
Fearon offer incremental common law developments that allow for 
application of traditional principles but avoid technological distinctions 
that would hamper practical application.  
                                                                                                                       
51  Fearon, supra, note 4, at para. 84. 
52  A production order is available for Internet subscriber information. A possible change 
would be creation of a form of pre-authorization that reflects a lower threshold for police to meet to 
access basic subscriber information. At present the general production order can be obtained on a 
reasonable belief standard (s. 487.014). Given the low privacy interest in the subscriber data, a 
reasonable suspicion standard, which is the standard for transmission data production (s. 487.016), 
would likely suffice to pass constitutional muster. 
53  See for example Fearon, supra, note 4, at para. 95: “The police simply did something 
that they believed on reasonable grounds to be lawful and were proven wrong, after the fact, by 
developments in the jurisprudence.” The evidence produced by the search incident to arrest of a cell 
phone in Fearon was not excluded, nor was the Internet subscriber data produced without a warrant 
in Spencer, supra, note 3, at para. 81. 
54  Tessling, supra, note 7, at para. 55. 
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What’s next? Well, for courts, what is next is what has already 
happened. Years ago. The Supreme Court will continue to make small 
but important steps to manage our expectations in new technological 
fields, while individuals experiment with the newer, faster and farther 
reaching capabilities that are years away from courtroom contemplation. 
Interception of applications on mobile devices, interjurisdictional debate 
over how to erect borders in a landscape of air, authorization for new 
techniques such as deliverable programs that install themselves on a 
target computer and report back with video, images, microphone and 
content recording;55 the next issues are crowding the horizon. Lawyers 
and courts will be plodding slowly through the fields, trampling a safe 
path, creating case law as road signs to guide us towards that ever-elusive 
frontier.
                                                                                                                       
55  See the United States District Court discussion of this technique in the Texas case In re 
Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F.Supp. 2d 753 (2013). 
 
